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Introduction 
Two decades ago, the calls of women’s groups for gender equality captured the attention of the legislatures, the courts, and the 
academy. “Liberal” feminist theorists called for the passage of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) and advocated 
the Supreme Court’s application of heightened scrutiny to gender classifications. Meanwhile, “radical” feminist theorists 
claimed that the liberal approach would achieve mere formal equality or equality of treatment between men and women but 
would not establish women’s actual equality in society. These radical theorists called for more extensive, affirmative 
government measures to achieve substantive equality for women. 
  
The states’ failure to ratify the liberal-supported federal ERA and the Court’s failure to adopt a strict scrutiny standard for 
gender-classificatory laws1 may appear to have rendered this liberal-radical debate academic. With the adoption of state equal 
rights amendments by several states, however, this debate merely has shifted to different forums. Although state courts have 
interpreted their state ERAs largely in accordance with the liberal analysis, the case law from these states provides material 
from which to analyze the efficacy of both the liberal approach to gender equality and the radical theorists’ critique of tha t 
approach. States with ERAs, therefore, serve as laboratories in which to consider the larger issue concerning which approach 
is more promising for achieving women’s equality. 
  
Part I of this Note briefly surveys different theoretical approaches to equality in general, exploring the contours of symmetrical 
and asymmetrical theories of equality. Part II focuses on gender equality theory in particular and considers liberal feminists’ 
call for equality of treatment as well as radical feminists’ demand for equality of results. Part III examines state courts’ 
interpretations of their state ERAs -- in particular, in areas where the applications of radical and liberal feminism support 
different results -- in order to assess the efficacy of these theories in practice. Part IV draws some lessons from states’ 
experiments with equality and concludes that while the liberals’ call for gender-neutral legislation should be heeded in general, 
the radical approach offers important insights into how legislation and doctrine can be crafted to achieve formal and substantive 
equality for women. 
  
I. Defining “Equality” 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “equal protection of the laws,”2 but courts and 
commentators disagree on how to interpret and apply this mandate of equality. Broadly speaking, two competing mediating 
principles for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause have been advanced: the symmetrical antidiscrimination principle and 
the asymmetrical disadvantaged-group principle. 
  
The antidiscrimination mediating principle is one of negative restraint that forbids the government from arbitrarily 
discriminating against classes of individuals. This principle prohibits legislative classifications based on illegitimate criteria, 
such as gender or race. The antidiscrimination principle is derived from the premise that equal protection requires equal 
treatment, which in turn requires that similarly situated parties are treated similarly. This mediating principle for interpreting 
the Equal Protection Clause theoretically does not provide for affirmative government action to achieve equality, but merely 
serves as a negative restraint on illegitimate government classifications. 
  
Equality theorists have criticized the antidiscrimination principle for its failure to recognize that the core problems of inequality 
are faced by distinct disadvantaged groups, such as women and blacks, and for its inability to remedy or improve the status of 
these subordinated groups in society.3 Professor Owen Fiss, an early critic of the antidiscrimination principle, offers in its place 
an asymmetrical mediating principle, the disadvantaged-group principle, for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause.4 
  
Professor Fiss argues that the proper concern of equal protection is with laws and practices that hurt disadvantaged groups in 




identifies social groups requiring special protection (including women and blacks), and calls for deferential judicial scrutiny 
(in practice, allowance) of policies benefiting disadvantaged groups and heightened scrutiny (disallowance) of policies 
impairing the status of such groups.6 Thus, the disadvantaged-group principle provides for an asymmetrical standard of scrutiny 
of legislation, with the level of scrutiny dependent upon whether disadvantaged groups are harmed or benefited by the 
legislation at issue, whereas the antidiscrimination principle provides for a symmetrical standard of scrutiny regardless of 
whether the legislative classification harms or benefits a disadvantaged group. 
  
For the past century, the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of how to interpret the Equal Protection Clause. In his oft-
quoted dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,7 Justice John Marshall Harlan ostensibly adopted a symmetrical antidiscrimination 
principle, stating that “our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”8 On the other 
hand, the famous language of Carolene Products9 footnote four arguably endorsed an asymmetrical disadvantaged-group 
principle, suggesting that heightened scrutiny should be applied in cases of prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities,”10 
rather than in all cases involving suspect classifications. The Court, however, rejected such an asymmetrical interpretation in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,11 stating that “the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when 
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.”12 
  
The Court also appears to have rejected an asymmetrical disadvantaged-group principle with respect to gender discrimination. 
In Craig v. Boren,13 for example, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to a gender-based statute that facially disadvantaged 
men.14 Similarly, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,15 the Court noted, “That this statutory policy discriminates 
against males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review.”16 In accordance 
with the antidiscrimination principle, the Court appears formally to apply the same level of scrutiny for “benign” gender 
classifications as for patently invidious ones.17 
  
Tensions still exist among the Justices, however, regarding the proper principle for interpreting equal protection in the area of 
gender. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, for example, has argued repeatedly that heightened judicial scrutiny should apply 
only to laws which discriminate against members of the disadvantaged group (i.e., against women) rather than to all laws that 
classify by gender.18 The proper selection of an interpretive principle, therefore, is an important and unsettled issue in equal 
protection theory, especially in the area of gender equality. 
  
II. Theories of Gender Equality 
In recent years, the issue surrounding the proper interpretation of the equal protection mandate has been joined by theorists of 
gender equality. In general, liberal feminist theorists have adopted a symmetrical antidiscrimination theory of gender equality 
and have emphasized equality of treatment; radical feminists have advocated an asymmetrical approach and focused on equality 
of results for women. 
  
Much has been written about liberal feminist theory, radical feminist theory, and the general differences between the two. 19 
Essentially, liberal feminism calls for equal treatment of men and women, or formal equality, and focuses on the fairness of the 
means of legislation; radical feminism focuses on equality of results, or substantive equality, which demands special treatment 
of women where necessary to attain this goal. Liberal feminists, in accord with the antidiscrimination principle, call for gender 
neutrality in legislation; radical feminists claim that in order to rectify the inferior position in which former discrimination has 
placed women, lawmakers and judges must take gender into account. Radical feminists believe that their liberal counterparts’ 
call for equal treatment of the sexes would be efficacious only in an ideal world, and that their own approach attempts to bring 
about justice for women given a less than ideal world by addressing the fact that women are in an inferior starting position to 
men.20 
  
In theory, liberal feminists oppose forward-looking (nonremedial) special treatment for women. Radical feminists, on the other 
hand, consider special treatment acceptable and necessary in some instances. Whereas liberal feminism calls for a symmetrical 
principle of equal protection, radical feminists sanction an asymmetrical principle to apply deferential scrutiny to gender-
classificatory legislation that benefits women and stricter scrutiny to legislation that facially and concretely discriminates 
against women. 
  




In line with their basic position on equality theory, liberal feminists interpret the federal ERA21 as a broad prohibition on 
legislative gender classifications. Barbara Brown, Thomas Emerson, Gail Falk, and Ann Freedman (“the Yale ERA 
commentators”), who most notably present the liberal feminist interpretation of the federal ERA, argue that in order to eliminate 
women’s historically inferior social position, courts should go beyond strict scrutiny and construe the ERA to prohibit gender 
classifications in the law.22 
  
Although they conclude that gender-based classifications generally should be barred, the Yale ERA commentators assert that 
the ERA would permit classifications based on a physical characteristic unique to one sex, such as pregnancy.23 The authors 
emphasize, however, that this exception would not extend to purported psychological, social, or other such asserted differences 
between the sexes.24 The authors argue that because this exception is susceptible of being used as a subterfuge for 
discrimination,25 classifications based on unique physical characteristics must bear a “close, direct and narrow relationship” to 
the asserted state purpose.26 
  
The liberal approach to gender discrimination, in particular as applied to the interpretation of the federal Equal Rights 
Amendment, has influenced state courts in their interpretation of state ERAs.27 But this approach is not without its critics. 
Radical theorists have argued that the liberal approach will not effectively bring about women’s substantive equality. The next 
Section considers the relevant aspects of the radical feminists’ critique. 
  
B. The Radical Feminists’ Challenge: Demanding Equality of Results 
In challenging the liberal feminist approach, Catharine MacKinnon, a leading radical feminist, extends Professor Fiss’ analysis 
of equal protection doctrine28 to the area of gender equality. Building upon Professor Fiss’ disadvantaged-group analysis, 
Professor MacKinnon develops an asymmetrical model of “substantive” gender equality,29 which emphasizes equality of results 
rather than equality or similarity of treatment.30 
  
MacKinnon condemns the uncritical acceptance by the courts and by liberal feminists of a “masculine” notion of equality 
embodied in the antidiscrimination principle’s “similarly situated” requirement.31 MacKinnon contends that the similarly 
situated requirement limits gender equality to “those issues men recognize as equality issues because they arise in contexts in 
which men now know they sometimes treat other men arbitrarily and irrationally.”32 MacKinnon claims that by reducing the 
real problem faced by women -- their subordination to men in all elements of society -- to the tidy issue of classification by 
gender in legislation, the liberal antidiscrimination approach “leaves out the social institutionalization of practices through 
which women are violated, abused, exploited, and patronized by men socially . . . .”33 According to MacKinnon, while the 
problems of women in society include their subordination and exploitation economically, socially, and sexually, liberal 
feminism’s response to these problems -- calling for scrutiny of legislative gender classifications -- merely addresses future 
legislatively imposed harms and thus falls woefully short of achieving substantive equality.34 
  
MacKinnon proposes an alternative model for securing gender equality whereby courts would strike down policies or practices 
that contribute to the maintenance of women’s subordinated position, regardless of whether such laws classify on the basis of 
gender.35 This “subordination model”36 would explicitly acknowledge the subjugated position of women in society and would 
work to abolish subordinating social practices that may not be readily cognizable under the liberal feminist analysis.37 
  
In sum, MacKinnon argues that the real barriers to women’s substantive equality will not be remedied adequately by the liberal 
feminists’ call for prohibiting legislative classifications by gender; rather, the symmetrical antidiscrimination principle 
advocated by liberal feminists may result in perpetuating women’s subordinated position in society. In lieu of the liberal 
approach, MacKinnon offers her subordination model for assessing the legality of laws and practices that implicate gender 
equality. 
  
While the radical-liberal debate is interesting on an academic level, it is not limited to the realm of theory. In evaluating liberal 
and radical theories of gender equality, feminist theorists may find it useful to observe such theories in action. As discussed in 
the next Section, state courts’ interpretations of their state ERAs provide such an opportunity to apply and evaluate the different 
theories of gender equality. 
  




In the 1970s, several states began experimenting with different models for protecting their citizens against gender 
discrimination. Between 1971 and 1974, fourteen states adopted equal rights amendments in some form.38 In interpreting their 
ERAs, these states have served as laboratories for testing and evaluating theories of gender equality.39 
  
The interpretation of ERAs in these states has brought about changes in gender-based statutes in many areas of the law. In order 
to evaluate the relative merits of competing feminist theories, it is useful to focus on those areas in which liberal and radical 
theories compel different results. Such controversial subject areas of application include domestic relations, criminal law, 
insurance, and school athletics. 
  
A. Domestic Relations 
In the domestic relations arena, state courts have utilized state ERAs to strike down many types of gender classifications, with 
some of the major developments occurring in child custody matters. States have rejected statutory presumptions that mothers 
are the more fit custodians40 and that fathers have the primary child support obligation,41 and have required gender-neutral duties 
of child support for children born out of wedlock.42 Additionally, fathers of children born outside of marriage have gained the 
right, previously held only by mothers, to withhold consent from their child’s adoption.43 
  
State courts also have invalidated many gender-based classifications in the areas of marriage and divorce. For example, the 
Illinois Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, invalidated a statutory scheme that required men to be twenty-one to marry 
without parental consent while allowing women to marry at eighteen without consent, finding no compelling purpose to justify 
this difference in treatment.44 Years before the United States Supreme Court struck down laws restricting alimony obligations 
to husbands,45 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated separation and divorce remedies provided only to wives.46 This 
court also held that the Pennsylvania ERA prohibits statutes that presume either the husband’s ownership of household 
property47 or his dominance in the marriage with respect to the negotiation of prenuptial and separation agreements.48 Likewise, 
this court invalidated a statute that failed to recognize the nonmonetary contribution of homemakers to marital property.49 
  
Courts in ERA states also have abolished or gender-neutralized several traditionally gender-specific common-law actions in 
the domestic relations field. These courts have invalidated common-law criminal conversation actions that allowed only 
husbands to sue their spouse’s sexual partner for damages,50 extended to wives the right to recover damages for loss of their 
husbands’ consortium,51 and mandated gender-neutral duties of spousal support during marriage.52 
  
Despite the fears of ERA opponents,53 two areas that have remained relatively unaffected by state ERAs are restrictions on 
same-sex marriages and abortion. States ostensibly applying absolute bars to gender classifications have refused to grant 
homosexual couples the right to marry, relying upon the commonplace definition of marriage54 and claiming that their decisions 
entail a classification by sexual preference rather than by gender.55 States also have refused to recognize abortion rights under 
their ERAs, claiming that providing state funding for childbirth and not for abortion turns on a woman’s decision to abort and 
therefore does not involve an impermissible gender classification.56 
  
The liberal feminist interpretation offered by the Yale ERA commentators largely has guided courts in interpreting their ERAs 
in the domestic relations arena.57 This body of case law thus offers an opportunity to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 
the liberal analysis. On the one hand, states have abolished many gender classifications that, under the guise of “protecting” 
women, actually served to discriminate invidiously against and to stereotype women.58 On the other hand, by requiring equal 
treatment of men and women in a world in which women are socially and financially subordinate to men, such state ERA cases 
may have served to perpetuate or worsen women’s subordinated position.59 In the past two decades, for example, male plaintiffs 
have utilized state ERAs to require women to pay more money in child support,60 to compel women to contribute more money 
to their husbands’ expenses,61 and to prevent women from rescinding prenuptial or separation agreements that arguably were 
agreed to under duress.62 
  
The prevalence of successful male plaintiffs in state domestic relations ERA actions may support radical feminists’ criticism 
of the inefficacy of the antidiscrimination principle for achieving substantive equality for women.63 By striving to achieve 
women’s formal equality rather than to remedy women’s subordinated status, interpretations in such cases may have worsened 
women’s position in society.64 For example, regarding the imposition of gender neutrality in custody preferences, one 
commentator writes, 
  




gender equality, carried a substantial price. In order to avoid expensive, traumatic, and perhaps unsuccessful custody fights, 
many mothers traded away property and support claims. . . . 
  
. . . . 
  
. . . What apparently escaped notice of courts imposing gender neutrality in this area were the inequalities in men’s and women’s 
status following divorce.65 Furthermore, the trend toward equalization of child support payments from mothers and fathers66 
may have harmful and disparate effects on women, who on average make 70 cents to every dollar a man makes.67 As one 
commentator notes regarding mandated equality in the domestic relations arena, 
  
Women’s . . . needs in this society may continue to be undervalued and ignored unless the equality rhetoric now associated 
with the relationship between the sexes is challenged as inappropriate for resolving situations where they stand in inherently 
unequal positions. . . . The metaphor has symbolic content that is preserved only at significant cost to many women who must 
suffer equality in this one area while the rest of the society and culture continues to treat them unequally.68 
  
The disagreement between the majority and the concurrence in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Simeone v. 
Simeone69 further highlights some of the tensions between liberal and radical theory as applied in the domestic relations arena. 
Declaring the presumption of male dominance in the negotiation of prenuptial agreements unconstitutional, the majority 
rejected the validity of the implied presumption that women are “uninformed, uneducated, and readily subjected to unfair 
advantage in marital agreements.”70 The court stated that “paternalistic presumptions and protections that arose to shelter 
women from the inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as having in earlier times have, appropriately, been 
discarded.”71 
  
The concurrence, however, criticized the majority’s opinion for its erroneous assumption that, upon the passage of the state 
ERA, “all vestiges of inequality between the sexes have been erased,”72 and claimed that the author of the majority opinion 
“does not live in the real world.”73 The concurrence asserted that the majority opinion makes “unnecessary and unwarranted 
declarations regarding the ‘equality’ of women” after the passage of the ERA, declarations which, on their face, “smack of 
male chauvinism, an attitude that ‘you women asked for it, now live with it.’ ”74 
  
The majority and concurring opinions in this case reflect the tensions between the liberal and radical feminist positions. While 
the majority focuses on eradicating gender classifications embodied in laws, the concurrence emphasizes the fact that women 
in general and the plaintiff in particular are not in a substantially equal position to men with respect to prenuptial agreement 
negotiations. The concurrence joins radical feminists in asserting that treating women equally before the law -- and thus 
ignoring their subordinated position -- may be insufficient to secure women’s actual equality in society. The majority aims for 
“justice in an ideal world”75 in which women are equal in bargaining power to men, and consequently mandates the equal 
treatment of male and female participants to the contract negotiation. The concurrence, however, argues for the recognition of 
the relevant features of our less than ideal world and emphasizes that the law should intervene to “protect the subservient party” 
in order to secure substantive equality, and not just equality of treatment, for the female litigant.76 
  
Thus, although ERA-mandated gender neutrality in the domestic relations arena successfully has eradicated legal countenance 
of sex-based stereotyping, it may have failed to address or remedy the reality of deeper sex-based disadvantages. The trend 
toward formally abolishing gender classifications in state domestic relations cases has not had a unilaterally positive effect 
toward achieving substantive equality for women. Perhaps by striving for equality in an ideal world, judges applying liberal 
feminist conceptions in interpreting ERAs in this area have ignored those relevant features of our imperfect world that stand in 
the way of women’s substantive equality. 
  
B. Criminal Law 
State plaintiffs have successfully invoked state ERAs to strike down certain types of gender-specific criminal laws, whereas 
other types have withstood constitutional attack. For example, courts have consistently invalidated gender distinctions in the 
area of criminal procedure. Applying their state ERAs, courts have prohibited the use of gender-based peremptory challenges, 
which deny the equal rights of female venirepersons.77 The Illinois Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, invalidated a 
gender-discriminatory statute that treated seventeen-year-old male criminal defendants as adults while treating females of the 





Gender-based criminal statutes involving sexual crimes, however, have been more resistant to state constitutional challenge. 
States have upheld incest statutes79 and sexual imposition statutes80 providing greater penalties for male than female offenders. 
State courts applying strict scrutiny,81 as well as those ostensibly imposing absolute bars to gender classifications,82 have upheld 
gender-based rape statutes by applying exceedingly deferential scrutiny to the legislation at issue. In ERA-based challenges to 
gender-specific statutory rape provisions, one state court has upheld differential treatment of male and female participants by 
referencing the unique physical characteristics exception to the mandate of gender neutrality articulated by the Yale ERA 
commentators.83 Several states, however, have read gender-neutral language into their gender-specific statutes governing sex 
crimes in order to insulate the statutes from ERA-based attack.84 
  
Courts’ divergent treatment of legislative gender classifications in cases involving sexual crimes reflects the disparate views of 
liberal and radical gender theorists on this issue. While liberal feminists85 (and Supreme Court Justices supportive of liberal 
feminism)86 would abolish gender classifications in this area, radical theorists like MacKinnon condemn such action. Facial 
gender neutralization in this area, according to MacKinnon, forestalls the requisite legal recognition of such “distinctive abuses 
of women as a gender.”87 For example, MacKinnon criticizes the dissenting opinion in Michael M. for advocating gender 
neutralization of the statutory rape law at issue: 
  
The dissent revealed more concern with avoiding the stereotyping attendant to the ideological message the law communicated 
than with changing the facts that make the stereotype largely true. In the interest of opposing facial distinctions and debunking 
the supposed myth of male sexual aggression, the fact that it is overwhelmingly girls who are sexually victimized by older 
males . . . was completely obscured. The facts of social inequality . . . that could have supported particular legislative attention 
to the sexual assault of girls were not even considered.88 
  
Judges in several strict scrutiny states appear to be consistent with MacKinnon’s asymmetrical approach in applying a more 
deferential standard of review to uphold gender-classificatory laws that disadvantage only male offenders in sexual crimes.89 
Because the definition of sexual crimes is often closely related to unique physical differences between males and females, state 
courts have relied upon this exception to uphold gender classifications in such statutes.90 In sum, the treatment of cases involving 
sexual crimes largely suggests a rejection in practice of the liberal feminists’ call for gender-neutral legislation and an adoption 
of an approach closer to the radical feminists’, which recognizes the reality in our imperfect world of females’ sexual 
victimization by males. 
  
C. Insurance 
State ERA litigation has also challenged the permissibility of gender-based insurance rates and insurance coverage. Applying 
the state ERA, a Pennsylvania court struck down an insurance statute authorizing differential automobile insurance rates based 
on gender (while prohibiting differential rates based on race, religion, or national origin).91 The court found that even though 
gender-differentiated rates were based on sound actuarial principles, the rates were impermissible because they relied on and 
perpetuated invidious stereotypes.92 To allow such rates, the court concluded, would be contrary to the state ERA’s goal of 
“eliminating sex as a basis for distinction.”93 In subsequent litigation, the Pennsylvania National Organization for Women 
claimed that newly established unisex rates were unfair to women because the rates required female drivers in effect to 
“subsidize” male drivers. The court, however, rejected this challenge and held that these unisex rates did not violate the state 
ERA.94 
  
Because liberal feminists generally advocate gender neutrality in legislation, one could reasonably assume that they would 
support the abolition of gender classifications in insurance rates and regulations -- even if this abolition would entail higher 
rates for women.95 However, the National Organization for Women (“NOW”), typically considered a liberal feminist 
organization,96 has opposed unisex rates because of their directly detrimental effect on women.97 MacKinnon, representing the 
radical feminist position, favors the stance of the Pennsylvania NOW on this issue, claiming that gender-neutral rates are less 
desirable than gender-specific rates because the former require women to pay for auto insurance “at the rate at which men need 
it.”98 
  
Liberal and radical feminist theorists, therefore, appear to agree that the unisex insurance rates mandated by state ERAs, 
although gender neutral, are undesirable because they are disadvantageous to women. This position for the liberal feminists, 
however, seems to be inconsistent. It could be argued that the liberal feminists, in advocating gender neutrality in legislation, 
must take the bitter with the sweet. Liberal feminists generally contend that empirical generalizations, even if accurate, cannot 




differences between men and women -- statistically measurable differences between the sexes considered as groups, such as 
the fact that men are generally stronger, more athletic, or better educated -- must not be allowed to justify gender-based 
classifications.99 Similarly, Justice Brennan, who adopted the liberal feminist approach in Craig v. Boren,100 rejected statistically 
measured generalities about the sexes as a justification for the gender-differentiated alcohol consumption law at issue in the 
case.101 Thus, while MacKinnon’s subordination test for gender-classificatory legislation is consistent in its support of gender-
differentiated insurance rates -- which do not contribute to the maintenance of women’s subordinated position -- it is difficult 
for the liberal feminist to defend such a result. If liberal feminists feel strongly about the desirability of gender-differentiated 
insurance rates, this contention would militate against their position of strict legislative gender neutrality. 
  
Another important area involving gender classifications in insurance law is health insurance coverage of pregnancy. The 
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,102 which defined pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination actionable under 
Title VII, rendered moot state efforts to make this same move under state ERAs. It is sufficient to note briefly that state plaintiffs 
have utilized ERAs to buttress their challenge to health insurance policies that exclude coverage of pregnancy-related costs. In 
Colorado, for example, a female litigant challenged her employer’s group health insurance policy, which excluded normal 
pregnancy expenses, by relying in part on the state ERA.103 The court in that case held that the employer had violated the state 
ERA by providing insurance that excluded from coverage medical expenses associated with normal pregnancy,104 noting that 
  
an employer offers fewer benefits to female employees on the basis of sex when it fails to provide them insurance coverage for 
pregnancy while providing male employees comprehensive coverage for all conditions, including those conditions unique to 
men. This disparity in the provision of comprehensive insurance benefits as a part of employment compensation constitutes 
discriminatory conduct on the basis of sex.105 
  
The debate among feminists on the issue of pregnancy discrimination is too wide-ranging and complex to be addressed 
adequately herein. It will suffice to observe briefly that liberal feminists in general (and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act) 
assimilate pregnancy-related disabilities with other types of disabilities.106 Radical feminists, however, criticize this move and 
argue that the liberal antidiscrimination principle is least well-suited to achieve equality for women in the area of pregnancy 
discrimination, and that special treatment of pregnancy is necessary.107 
  
In sum, state ERAs have been utilized to strike down gender-based insurance rates even though such rates rested on statistically 
accurate generalizations and were financially favorable to women. State ERAs also have been used to buttress challenges to 
insurance policies that excluded coverage of pregnancy expenses. 
  
D. School Athletics 
In the arena of school athletics, the interpretation of state ERAs has served both to insulate female teams from participation by 
males and to open up all-male teams to female membership.108 For example, in Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass’n,109 a high 
school denied a male student’s attempt to join the school’s all-female volleyball team where the school offered no opportunities 
for males to play volleyball. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the gender-segregated team by focusing explicitly on equality 
of results -- competitive athletic opportunities for both sexes -- instead of equality of treatment.110 Because it accepted the 
presumption that boys generally were better athletes than girls and thus likely would take over girls’ positions on the team, the 
majority argued that explicitly granting boys equal treatment and allowing them to join the volleyball team would diminish 
girls’ athletic opportunities.111 According to the court, by maintaining volleyball as the all-female fall sport and football as the 
all-male fall sport, the school provided comparable athletic opportunities -- equality of results -- for both boys and girls.112 
  
The Petrie dissent, however, criticized the majority’s adoption of an asymmetrical disadvantaged-group principle for the 
purpose of protecting female athletic opportunities. The dissent stated that it could not accept the majority’s application of a 
different standard of scrutiny for interpreting the ERA when males instead of females were facially disadvantaged by the law 
at issue, noting that “there can no longer be any question but that freedom from discrimination is a two-way door.”113 Referring 
to the explicitly symmetrical principle of equal protection adopted by the Supreme Court in Bakke, the dissent quoted from 
Justice Lewis Powell’s judgment of the Court: “ ‘It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons 
permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others.’ ”114 
  
While applauding the result the majority strove to reach, the dissent adhered to liberal feminist theory by emphasizing equality 
of treatment over equality of results. The dissent argued that the means by which the majority reached its result -- the 




gender -- was impermissible.115 The dissent noted that “sex-based generalizations have been discarded in many cases where 
there was statistical support for the presumption upon which the classifications were based,”116 and argued, quoting Craig, that 
“the weakness of such statistics as predictors of any one individual’s behavior ‘merely illustrates that proving broad sociological 
propositions by statistics . . . inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.’ 
”117 In an effort to illustrate the tension with the normative philosophy of equality inherent in the majority’s approach of 
“protecting weaker from stronger athletes,”118 the dissent noted, 
  
Surely, not even the majority here, nor society generally, would condone the exclusion of blacks from an all-white basketball 
team on the grounds that blacks generally are more skilled at the game than whites and might tend to dominate it. . . . There are 
legally tolerable means of categorizing athletes by size, strength, and ability. To adopt sex as a proxy for more precisely defined 
means of leveling off competition is both illegal and irrational.119 
  
Quoting Justice John Paul Stevens, the dissent concluded that gender equality must mean fairness to individuals, not fairness 
to groups in general, and therefore that the state ERA must be interpreted to preclude treatment of individuals simply as 
components of a gender class.120 It should be noted, however, that the dissent’s rejection of an asymmetrical disadvantaged-
group principle in favor of an antidiscrimination principle compels a result that may be directly harmful to the class of females 
in the short term by allowing males to displace females on the school volleyball team. 
  
In Darrin v. Gould,121 the Washington Supreme Court heard the ERA challenge of two fully qualified high school girls who 
were denied permission to play on the all-male high school football team because of their gender. The court recognized that 
the sort of disadvantaged-group rationale advanced by the Petrie majority -- the protection and fostering of girls’ athletic 
opportunities -- “ ‘can obviously have no validity with respect to those sports for which only one team exists in a school and 
that team’s membership is limited exclusively to boys.’ ”122 The court rejected the use of statistically based generalities to justify 
the assumption that girls as a group are weaker or more injury prone than boys and thus could be excluded on the basis of those 
average differences.123 The court focused instead on equality of treatment for the individual girls in question, noting that “ ‘if 
any individual girl is too weak, injury-prone, or unskilled, she may, of course, be excluded from competition on that basis but 
she cannot be excluded solely because of her sex without regard to her relevant qualifications.’ ”124 
  
As Petrie and Darrin illustrate, the treatment in the ERA states of gender segregation in athletics reflects the divergent analyses 
of feminist theorists of this issue. Focusing on equality of results instead of equality of treatment, radical feminists claim that 
mandating gender neutrality in athletic regulations may diminish overall women’s equality in athletics.125 Liberal feminists, 
however, generally reject the special treatment doctrine justifying gender segregation in athletics.126 While supportive of the 
goal of promoting females’ athletic opportunities, liberal feminists claim that this end must be achieved without the use of 
presumptions or classifications based on gender. Instead, gender-neutral classifications such as height, weight, or skill must be 
relied upon in the effort to promote meaningful athletic competition for members of both sexes. According to liberal feminists, 
because the use of statistically based generalizations regarding the average differences between the sexes is capable of such 
serious misuse, such generalizations must be barred in all instances and cannot be paraded out when convenient for women.127 
  
In sum, ERAs have had a pronounced effect on many areas of state law. Considering courts’ interpretations of their ERAs in 
controversial areas provides insights into the relative merits of liberal feminist and radical feminist theory, as applied. The 
lessons that can be drawn from state courts’ experiences in applying these theories will be considered further in the next Part. 
  
IV. Lessons from States’ Experiments 
In interpreting their ERAs, state courts generally have comported with the liberal feminist approach to gender equality by 
abolishing or strictly scrutinizing gender classifications embodied in legislation and common-law doctrines. Radical feminists 
such as MacKinnon have been critical of the liberal feminists’ goal of formal equality and have offered instead an explicitly  
substantive analysis that would directly address women’s subordinated position in society. State courts’ experimentation with 
implementing feminist theory indicates the shortcomings of both liberal and radical theory and provides insights towards 
synthesizing the two. 
  
A consideration of state ERA litigation illustrates some inadequacies in the liberal feminists’ call to abolish essentially all 
gender classifications in legislation. In the domestic relations area, liberal feminism arguably has been applied to compel 
women to “suffer equality” to their detriment.128 Abolishing legislative gender classifications in this area, for example, has 




contracts,129 to mandate equalization of alimony obligations and child support,130 and to deprive women more readily of custody 
of their children,131 thereby worsening women’s status relative to the analogous gender-specific laws. The gender neutralization 
of statutes involving sexual crimes132 arguably serves to mask males’ sexual dominance and coercive behavior and to forestall 
legal attention to this abuse of women “as a gender.”133 In insurance regulation, gender neutralization has required women to 
pay higher auto insurance premiums,134 in effect, to subsidize the inferior driving habits of their male counterparts. In the arena 
of school athletics, males have invoked liberal feminism’s call for gender neutralization to claim the right to participate on all-
female sports teams,135 a result which arguably would worsen women’s athletic opportunities. A survey of state ERA litigation, 
therefore, lends credence to the radical feminists’ charge that liberal feminism serves to bring about women’s formal equality 
but is deficient in securing their substantive equality. 
  
Considering the problems inherent in the liberal approach, it may be argued that the radical program for women’s substantive 
equality should be pursued instead. If, as MacKinnon contends, liberal feminism’s call for abolishment of gender classifications 
in our imperfect world tends to freeze women in their subordinated status, an approach that explicitly recognizes and addresses 
women’s unequal starting position would seem to be more advantageous. 
  
MacKinnon claims that the path to women’s substantive equality begins with the judicial adoption of her proposed 
subordination model, which requires judges to invalidate those practices and policies that contribute to the subordination of 
women.136 This asymmetrical approach would leave intact legislation classifying on the basis of gender as long as such 
legislation does not contribute to the maintenance of women’s subordinated position. MacKinnon’s subordination model 
arguably would serve to uphold much of the legislation that liberal feminism would strike down. For example, in the domestic 
relations arena, the subordination principle would uphold gender-specific laws requiring males to pay more in child support or 
alimony than females as well as laws embodying the presumption of a husband’s psychological dominance in contracting with 
his wife. Because such laws cause concrete harms to men and are challenged by male plaintiffs, MacKinnon’s asymmetrical 
approach calling for deferential judicial scrutiny of gender-classificatory laws harming males arguably would uphold such 
laws.137 Similarly, the subordination approach would validate laws punishing only males in sex crimes, including statutory 
rape.138 In the arena of school athletics, MacKinnon’s approach arguably would preserve gender-segregated teams, or at least 
insulate all-female teams from challenge by male litigants. 
  
Despite its utility in addressing laws that cause concrete harms to women, MacKinnon’s subordination principle may be 
ineffectual in its failure to abolish laws that cause stigmatic harms to women as well as concrete harms to men.139 For example, 
a child custody law which embodies the presumption that the mother is the more fit custodian may cause concrete harms to 
men by working to deny them custody of their children, but also causes stigmatic harm to women by embodying an invidious 
“separate spheres” ideology, in which the childrearing function “naturally” belongs in the women’s sphere. Similarly, a 
domestic relations law that embodies a presumption of male psychological dominance in intraspousal contracts may cause 
concrete harms to men -- thus provoking them to challenge its constitutionality -- but also causes stigmatic harms to women by 
embodying the invidious stereotype that women as a class are psychologically subordinate or inferior to men. Because 
MacKinnon’s subordination approach arguably would apply to uphold such laws -- in contradistinction to the liberal gender-
neutralization approach140 -- it would leave intact such embodiments of harmful gender stereotypes. Thus, MacKinnon’s 
subordination approach would not eradicate legal recognition of stigmatic harms to women that the majority of recent gender-
classificatory laws embody. 
  
Furthermore, an asymmetrical approach, exemplified by MacKinnon’s subordination principle, calls for the establishment of 
different standards of scrutiny for laws discriminating against men and for those discriminating against women. As a practical 
matter, this approach lends itself to misapplication and misuse. A court may have difficulty determining whether a gender-
classificatory law harms men or women, as the Supreme Court’s difficulties in this area have demonstrated.141 Worse yet, a 
court may use this asymmetrical standard to uphold invidious protectionist discrimination against women “which, in practical 
effect, puts women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”142 A critic of MacKinnon has argued that the subordination approach 
makes a return to such an era of invidious protectionist discrimination “all too likely,”143 noting that Muller v. Oregon,144 a 
protectionist Lochner145 era case restricting women’s working hours on the rationale that women’s primary function was to bear 
children, was cited approvingly by a 1974 Supreme Court case upholding remedial legislation on behalf of women.146 Thus, the 
dangers inherent in applying a double standard to gender-discriminatory laws militate against MacKinnon’s subordination 
approach to gender equality.147 Furthermore, MacKinnon’s subordination model is problematic in that it relies on the courts to 
make subjective and complex judgments as to whether laws contribute to the subordination of women. It is far easier for a 
judge effectively to apply the liberal analysis’ virtually absolute bar to gender-classificatory laws than it is effectively to apply 
the MacKinnon subordination test. If judges interpreting state ERAs were required to undertake the complex subordination 





Consideration of state ERA litigation has illustrated advantages and disadvantages of the liberal and radical feminist 
approaches, as presently constituted. States’ experiments with gender equality also suggest a direction for synthesis of these 
two theoretical approaches, in what will be referred to as the “informed gender-neutral” approach. 
  
The informed gender-neutral approach recognizes that eradication of legislative gender classifications as required by the liberal 
approach benefits women by abolishing the embodiments of stigmatic harms, but also harms women by its failure to take 
cognizance of women’s unequal starting position and its lack of sensitivity to the types of disadvantages confronted by many 
women in our imperfect world. The informed gender-neutral approach acknowledges and incorporates the critiques offered by 
radical feminism, which have served to isolate those aspects of our imperfect world that bring the most harm to women. This 
approach utilizes radical feminist theory to help identify areas of women’s subordination which serve “as a clue, as a ‘logic of 
identification’ to the location of subordinated . . . groups for whom legal assistance may be helpful.”148 This approach recognizes 
opportunities for using gender-neutral legislation truly to remedy individual women’s subordinate position, to ameliorate 
concrete harms as well as the stigmatic harms that accompany gender-specific classifications. Given the radical feminist 
critique, which identifies areas in our less than ideal world in which men tend to be psychologically, financially, sexually, and 
athletically dominant, the informed gender-neutral approach calls for the crafting of gender-neutral legislation and doctrines to 
remedy these types of subordination -- regardless of the gender of the subordinated party. 
  
Under an informed gender-neutral approach, for example, courts would consider whether either party to a prenuptial or 
separation agreement exercised impermissibly coercive behavior. Thus, while the gender-based presumption of a husband’s 
psychological dominance in spousal contract negotiations would be abolished, the court would not turn a blind eye to the 
existence of any overreaching which may have occurred and would not force women to “suffer equality.” Instead, judges would 
consider whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, impermissible spousal coercion occurred during contract 
negotiations and would grant appropriate relief to the coerced party, whether husband or wife. Similarly, under the informed 
gender-neutral approach, statutory rape and sexual imposition statutes would be drafted in gender-neutral language but tailored 
to identify the party exercising impermissibly coercive sexual behavior. Under this approach, athletic regulations would be 
drafted in terms of finely tuned gender-neutral classifications that foster meaningful athletic opportunities between persons of 
equal skill and ability regardless of their gender. By refusing to use “female” as a placeholder for “the psychologically or 
financially or sexually or athletically subordinate party,” such informed gender-neutral legislation and judicial doctrines would 
serve to remedy actual problems faced by women, while not crystallizing harmful gender stereotypes nor embodying stigmatic 
harms to women. By addressing disparities in starting positions without making classification turn on gender, informed gender 
neutrality serves the goals of both formal and substantive equality. 
  
In sum, radical feminist analysis is helpful in identifying the types of disadvantages -- sexual, psychological, economic, or 
physical subordination -- that historically have confronted women as a class. The critiques offered by theorists such as 
MacKinnon have served to identify those aspects of our imperfect world that bring the most harm to women. Feminists in state 
legislatures and courthouses should adopt an informed gender-neutral approach to remedy women’s subordinate position in 
society by attending carefully to such factors and by crafting them into gender-neutral legislation and judicial doctrines that are 
advantageous to women. Only then can equality of treatment be coextensive with equality of results for both women and men. 
  
Appendix 
State Equal Rights Amendments 
Alaska 
No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin. The 












No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or 
enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, or sex. Conn. Const. 




Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex. The legislature shall have the 




The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government 




No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or 
religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person 








All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned 
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that 
of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, 




The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor 
any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights 












Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of 




Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. Tex. Const. art. I, 




The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male 
and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges. Utah Const. art. IV, s 




The right to be free from any governmental discrimination upon the basis of religious conviction, race, color, sex, or national 
origin shall not be abridged, except that the mere separation of the sexes shall not be considered discrimination. Va. Const. art. 




Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Wash. Const. art. XXXI, 




In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal. Wyo. Const. art. I, 
s 2 (ratified 1889). 
  
Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state 
affecting the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or 
condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Id. s 3. 
  
The rights of citizens of the State of Wyoming to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both 










“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice 




Three years after the Supreme Court inaugurated its special equal protection treatment of gender in Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971), the Court came within one vote of declaring gender to be a suspect classification meriting the strictest 
judicial scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Justice William Brennan’s four-vote plurality 
opinion in Frontiero emphatically stated reasons for granting this heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate against 
women. Comparing the history of treatment of women in this country with that of blacks, Justice Brennan noted that 
women could not vote until this century, were often the victims of invidious stereotypes, and were subject to widespread 
discrimination. Id. at 684-85. He noted further that gender, like race, “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform 
or contribute to society.” Id. at 686. In contrast, Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Lewis Powell and Harry 
Blackmun, who concurred only in the result, felt that a judicial declaration that gender was a suspect class should be 
postponed pending the outcome of the ratification of the federal Equal Rights Amendment, which, these Justices 
believed, would resolve precisely this question. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). 
Eventually, Justice Brennan garnered a majority of votes in support of applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to 
gender classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This intermediate standard requires that gender 








See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107 (1976); Vernon Van Dyke, 












See id. at 136, 160-61. Professor Fiss argues that the disadvantaged-group principle for interpreting the Equal Protection 
Clause would serve explicitly redistributive aims, improve the position of historically subordinated groups, and provide 
a coherent theoretical framework for the preferential treatment of disadvantaged groups (in contradistinction to the 















































See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny to strike down law 
that required widower but not widow to prove actual dependence on deceased spouse’s earnings to qualify for death 
benefits). The Court, however, disagreed about whether the law disadvantaged the widower himself or his working wife 
because the wife can expect fewer death benefits to be paid to her spouse than those payable to the spouses of her male 
co-workers. Compare id. at 147-49 (holding that the law discriminated against both males and females) with id. at 155 




See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1981) (upholding a gender-based statutory rape statute and 
finding “nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of the special 
solicitude of the courts”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 225-26 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 




For discussion of the liberal feminist approach, see, e.g., David L. Kirp, Mark G. Yudof & Marlene S. Franks, Gender 
Justice (1986); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 27-40 (1975); Wendy W. 
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 175, 193-
200 (1982) hereinafter Williams, The Equality Crisis. For discussion of the equal treatment/special treatment debate, 
see, e.g., Elizabeth H. Wolgast, Equality and the Rights of Women 37-55 (1980); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s 
Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1985). 





See Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699, 1701-02 (1990). Professor Radin 
writes, “There are two ways to think about justice. One is to think about justice in an ideal world .... The other is to 




The proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment stated, in relevant part: 
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. H.R.J. 




See Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A 




The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights 
of women, or of men. This means that the treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance 
that such person is of one sex or the other.... Differentiation in treatment may rest upon particular characteristics or 
traits of the persons affected, such as strength, intelligence, and the like. But under the Equal Rights Amendment the 
existence of such a characteristic or trait to a greater degree in one sex does not justify classification by sex rather than 
by the particular characteristic or trait.... In short, sex is a prohibited classification. Id. The authors reject the notion that 
the ERA merely requires strict scrutiny for gender classifications because strict scrutiny allows judges impermissible 
discretion in determining whether an asserted state goal is compelling and whether the law is necessary to achieve that 




Id. at 893-94. This unique physical characteristics exception, for instance, would permit laws establishing medical leave 
for childbearing (but not child rearing) because such a classification is based on an actual physical difference between 








See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding a state law limiting women’s employment in factories 
or laundries to ten hours a day on the grounds that a woman’s “physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal 
functions -- having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race -- justify legislation to protect her 




Brown et al., supra note 22, at 894. The authors argue that by requiring gender classifications to be based on actual 
physical characteristics that distinguish women from men (e.g., menstruation, pregnancy, and lactation), the ERA would 
prohibit classifications grounded in average or stereotypical differences between the sexes (average differences such as 
that men are taller, heavier, and stronger than women). See id. at 889-900; see also Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, 
Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913, 922-23 (1983) (distinguishing definitional differences 
between men and women from average differences). For example, under this view, the ERA would serve to strike down 
a law allowing only women to take extensive employment leave for childrearing purposes even though, on average, 
more women than men take responsibility for rearing children. Instead, the legislature would be required to recast the 
law to allow employment leave for the parent responsible for childrearing, whether male or female. In short, even if the 













MacKinnon is one of several radical feminist theorists who concentrate on “substantive” gender equality. This Note 









As if there could be no other way of thinking about it, in gender discrimination cases the courts adopted the content of 
the concept of equality from Aristotle’s axiom that equality meant treating likes alike and unlikes unalike, an approach 
embodied in the Constitution’s “similarly situated” requirement .... Id. at 1286-87. MacKinnon argues that the similarly 




sexual aggression and reproductive rights. Id. at 1297. In cases such as these, the application of the antidiscrimination 
principle “will not find women ‘similarly situated’ to men,” and thus will be powerless to effect any change. 




Catharine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 766 (1987) (reviewing Jane J. 
Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (1986)). MacKinnon writes that the similarly situated approach “precludes the 
distinctive abuses of women as a gender -- for example, rape, denial of reproductive control, and prostitution -- from 








See MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1286-97. Accordingly, MacKinnon also laments the shift in the proposed language 
of the federal ERA from an affirmative guarantee of equal rights, as is embodied in the 1923 version, to a mere negative 
restraint on discrimination by the government, as is embodied in the 1971 version. See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 
770. Compare S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 Cong. Rec. 150 (1923) (“Men and women shall have equal rights 
throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction.”) and H.R.J. Res. 75, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 
Cong. Rec. 285 (1923) (same) with H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) ( “Equality of rights 








For the purposes of this Note, MacKinnon’s approach will be referred to as the “subordination model,” although she 
refers to her approach alternatively as the “dominance approach,” id. at 40, and the “inequality approach,” see, e.g., 




Under MacKinnon’s analysis, such subordinating social practices include sex segregation in poverty, violence against 
women, unequal pay, rape, sexual assault, domestic violence, prostitution, and pornography. See MacKinnon, supra 




Presently, sixteen states have adopted ERAs of some kind. See infra Appendix for text and ratification dates of the state 
provisions. In 1992, the citizens of Iowa prevented their state from becoming the seventeenth by failing to ratify their 
proposed ERA. See Robert Reinhold, Move to Limit Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 5, 1992, at B8. The equal rights provisions of two states (Utah and Wyoming) were actually part of their original 
constitutions. Four other states (Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, and Montana) included equal rights provisions when they 
revised their constitutions, so these provisions are not amendments per se. For the sake of convenience, however, this 
Note will refer to all of these equal rights provisions as ERAs. 
It is interesting to note the wide discrepancy between the number of states that now have state ERAs (sixteen) and the 
number that voted to approve the federal Equal Rights Amendment (thirty-five of the necessary thirty-eight). See 
generally Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender 63-80 (1989) (discussing the campaign for, and aftermath of, the 




Even before states adopted equal rights amendments, courts in some states diverged from the federal model by 
interpreting their state equal protection clauses to apply stricter scrutiny to gender classifications. See, e.g., In re Leach, 
34 N.E. 641 (Ind. 1893). Before the Supreme Court accorded heightened scrutiny to gender classifications, one state 
declared women a suspect class and applied heightened scrutiny to strike down gender-based statutes. See Sail’er Inn 
v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 538-43 (Cal. 1971). Of course, in order to adhere to federal equal protection requirements, state 
courts must not fall below the federal minimum of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications set out in Craig v. 








See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 352 N.E.2d 19, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (applying state ERA to render maternal preference in 
child custody unconstitutional); Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 639-40 (Pa. 1977) (same). 
But see Harper v. Harper, 229 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Va. 1976) (recognizing implicit maternal preference despite state ERA). 
These disparate results may stem in part from the differing levels of scrutiny used by the respective states in applying 
their ERAs. For example, Pennsylvania applies a near absolute bar to legislative gender classifications; Virginia, 
however, uses only the federal intermediate scrutiny standard. 
The standards of review for gender discrimination adopted by states with ERAs fall into three categories. First, states 
conforming to the federal minimum level of scrutiny to gender classifications include Utah, see Estate of Scheller v. 
Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70, 76-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Virginia, see Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 1973). 
Second, states applying strict scrutiny to gender classifications include Colorado, see R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 
671-72 (Colo. 1980); Connecticut, see Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 161 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Hawaii, see Baehr 
v. Levin, 852 P.2d 44, 63-67 (Haw. 1993); Illinois, see People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Massachusetts, 
see Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 206 (Mass. 1977); and Texas, see Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 
S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). Third, states virtually barring gender classifications include Maryland, see 
Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 902-05 (Md. 1977); Pennsylvania, see Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 




See, e.g., Rand, 374 A.2d at 905 (requiring gender-neutral child support responsibilities under the state ERA); Conway 




See Commonwealth v. Rebovich, 406 A.2d 791, 792-93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (reading gender-neutral language into 




See Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603, 605-06 (Pa. 1976) (holding that statute requiring only mother’s consent for 
adoption of child born out of wedlock violates state ERA’s absolute bar to gender-based classifications). Here, the court 
noted that “federal constitutional law compels the same result we reach on the basis of the Pennsylvania ERA.” Id. at 

















See DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1975) (striking down presumption that household goods acquired 




See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (discarding paternalistic presumption of women’s inferior 
bargaining position and status in prenuptial agreement); see also Bell v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 




See, e.g., DiFlorido, 331 A.2d at 179 (rejecting lower court rule that awarded ownership of household items to their 




contributions made by either spouse”); Holmes v. Holmes, 127 Pittsburgh Legal J. 196, 197 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Fam. Div. 
1978) (finding rule limiting alimony to one-third of the paying spouse’s earnings regardless of need violative of “the 




See Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (Md. 1980) (holding that a criminal conversation action under which only men 








See McWilliams v. McWilliams, 537 A.2d 35, 36-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting that the right of financial support 
during marriage depends not upon the sex of the petitioner but rather upon need, in view of the relative financial 




Reverend Pat Robertson, the conservative televangelist, warned that Iowa’s proposed, and ultimately defeated, ERA 
was part of a “socialist, anti-family political movement that encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their 
children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism and become lesbians.” Pat Robertson Says Feminists Want to Kill Kids, 




See De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 954-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (refusing to recognize common-law marriage 




See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-97 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding denial of marriage license to two male 
applicants against ERA challenge). This past year, however, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44 (Haw. 1993), held that its marriage statute limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex facially discriminated on 
the basis of sex, thus implicating Hawaii’s ERA. Id. at 60. The court, relying upon Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967), remanded the issue with the instruction that the burden rested on the state to overcome the presumption that the 
marriage statute is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it was narrowly tailored to further compelling state interests. 




See Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 124-26 (Pa. 1985). The court’s discussion in Fischer lends 
credence to MacKinnon’s critique of the similarly situated analysis for gender discrimination. MacKinnon argues that 
the similarly situated analysis is ineffectual in achieving women’s equality because it does not apply -- and can afford 
no guarantee of fair and equal treatment -- in important circumstances where women are not similarly situated to men. 
See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. The court’s analysis in Fischer exemplifies this deficiency in the similarly 
situated analysis. The Fischer court notes, 
The decision whether or not to carry a fetus to term is so unique as to have no concomitance in the male of the species. 
Thus, this statute, which is solely directed to that unique facet is in no way analogous to those situations where the 
distinctions were “based exclusively on the circumstance of sex ....” Id. at 126 (quoting People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 




See, e.g., Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (Md. 1977) (explicitly citing the Yale ERA commentators for the proposition 




See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (invalidating the presumption that the husband is 







See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (upholding prenuptial agreement in which wife 





















See, e.g., Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165 (eliminating presumption of male dominance in negotiating prenuptial agreement). 
















Martha L. Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman’s Divorce Revolution, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 781, 783 























































See, e.g., People v. Medrano, 321 N.E.2d 97, 98-99 (Ill. 1974). In upholding a rape statute applicable only to males, the 
court quoted State v. Kelly, 526 P.2d 720, 723 (Ariz. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 (1975), and State v. Ewald, 216 





See Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 673 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). In upholding a rape statute applicable only to males, 
the court stated that “ ‘a legislative classification will not be set aside if any state of facts rationally justifying it is 
demonstrated to or perceived by the courts.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Maryland Sav.-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 




People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (Colo. 1976). Citing the Yale ERA commentators, the court stated that Colorado’s 
ERA “does not prohibit differential treatment among the sexes when, as here, that treatment is reasonably and genuinely 
based on physical characteristics unique to just one sex.” Id. For a discussion of the Yale ERA commentators’ analysis, 




See, e.g., Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Tex. 1978) (reading gender-neutral language into statutory rape 
provision); Note, Rape and Other Sexual Offense Law Reform in Maryland, 1976-1977, 1977 U. Balt. L. Rev. 151 




















See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. For example, the court in People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1976), 
upholding a rape statute that punishes only male offenders, focused on physical characteristics unique to one sex. Id. at 
706. This focus alone, however, is not enough to justify its falling within the liberal feminists’ unique physical 
characteristics exception. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The liberal view articulated by the Yale ERA 
commentators demands that the unique physical characteristic bear a “close, direct, and narrow relation” to the asserted 
state purpose. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The Salinas court, however, does not undertake such an inquiry. 
See Salinas, 551 P.2d at 706; see also Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 673 (Md. 1975) (applying most lenient scrutiny 























Pennsylvania Nat’l Org. for Women v. Commonwealth Ins. Dep’t, 551 A.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), 




Acting in the statutory context of Title VII, the Supreme Court, which leans toward the liberal feminist position, has 
refused to countenance gender-differentiated retirement plans and employee group insurance premiums based on the 
accurate generalization that women live longer than men. See Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & 
Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1081-86 (1983) (invalidating gender differentiation in 
retirement benefits); Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-11 (1978) (invalidating 
























Justice Brennan asserted that “statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies 
of aggregate groups” must not be allowed to render equal protection principles inapplicable. Id. at 208-09. As an 
example of the dangers inherent in legislation incorporating statistically based generalities, Justice Brennan warned that 
“States could freely favor Jews and Italian Catholics at the expense of all other Americans in regulating alcohol 
consumption, since available studies regularly demonstrate that the former two groups exhibit the lowest rates of 












Id. at 1365. 
 















School athletic programs must also withstand scrutiny under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which 
forbids discrimination based on sex in any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. See 
















Id. In order to reach its result, the majority deemed the “preservation, fostering and promotion of interscholastic athletic 
competition for both boys and girls” to be a “compelling governmental interest” and noted that although gender-
segregated teams were not an “absolute necessity” for achieving this end, “the combination of problems which we 
believe to be likely to arise from attempts to do so through other classifications e.g., through gender-neutral 

















Id. at 867 (Craven, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to the presumption in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), that 
men were more conversant in business than women and the presumption in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973), that men were more likely to be the breadwinners in the family than women as examples of impermissible sex-





































Id. at 891 (quoting Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 334 A.2d at 843). The court considered but rejected the 
notion that the maintenance of gender-segregated sports teams in general was necessary to protect and foster girls’ 
athletic programs, finding that such an end could not be considered a compelling state interest because “the overriding 
compelling state interest as adopted by the people of this state in 1972 is that: ‘Equality of rights and responsibility 
















See Fineman, supra note 68, at 783; see also supra Part III.A (discussing state courts’, as well as liberal and radical 





































Professor Joan Williams considers the application of MacKinnon’s subordination principle to gender-based 




Mich. L. Rev. 797, 838 (1989). Professor Williams argues that “MacKinnon’s approach without a doubt would serve 
to reinforce and to legitimize gender stereotypes that are an integral part of the increasingly oppressive gender system,” 








Stigmatic harms include harms that impose a badge of inferiority -- a stigma -- upon a class of persons but which do 
not impose more concrete injury. The Supreme Court first referred to stigmatic harm in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, a black defendant was convicted of murder by a jury from which blacks were excluded 
by law. The Court focused not only on the concrete harm to the black defendant himself but also on the stigmatic harm 
the exclusionary law caused to blacks in general by barring them from serving on juries. The Court wrote, 
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the 
administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color ... is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an 




The liberal feminist approach, with its emphasis on equality of treatment, prohibits all classifications based on gender. 
Therefore, laws embodying stigmatic harms to women, as well as laws embodying concrete harms to women, would 
be struck down under the liberal approach. By advocating gender-neutral legislation, liberal feminist theory may take 





Compare Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147-49 (1980) (striking down law favoring widows and 
disfavoring widowers on grounds that law harms both widowers and working women) with Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that a classification more favorable to widows than widowers 








Nadine Taub, Book Review, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1686, 1691-92 (1980) (reviewing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual 
















See, e.g., Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 19, at 189-90, 195-99 (focusing on the great costs of special 




Mary J. Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim “A Different Voice”?, 15 Harv. Women’s L.J. 
37, 64 (1992). 
 
 
